[ovirt-devel] Abusing injection and DB access

[Moti Asayag]

Hi All,

ATM, there are 78 occurrences of "Injector.injectMembers(new
AuditLogableBase())" in ovirt-engine project, which their main purpose is
to ease the resolve of the placeholders of the audit log message while
logging an event.

For instance AuditLogType.MAC_ADDRESS_IS_EXTERNAL is being used from
ImportVmCommandBase.java in the following way:

private AuditLogableBase createExternalMacsAuditLog(VM vm, Set<String>
externalMacs) {
        AuditLogableBase logable = *Injector.injectMembers*(new
AuditLogableBase());
        logable.setVmId(vm.getId());
        logable.setCustomCommaSeparatedValues("MACAddr", externalMacs);
        return logable;
    }

The entry in the properties file is:
MAC_ADDRESS_IS_EXTERNAL=VM ${*VmName*} has MAC address(es) ${MACAddr},
which is/are out of its MAC pool definitions.

Therefore the only purpose of the injection is to allow the
AuditLogDirector to resolve the ${*VmName*} which is already known at the
time of creating the AuditLogableBase entry.

The result is injecting the DAOs for the AuditLogableBase instance and
using the VM dao to retrieve the VM entry from the DB.
This is just a wastef of injection and DB access while both can be spared.

This could have been easily replaced by one of the following:

   - auditLogableBase.setVmName(vm.getName());
   - auditLogableBase.addCustomValue("VmName", vm.getName());

Please pick up any occurrence from your domain and send a patch to replace
it where possible.
Thanks in advance,
Moti
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