Re: Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins

----- Original Message ----- > From: "Robert Middleswarth" <robert(a)middleswarth.net&gt; > To: infra(a)ovirt.org > Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 8:00:44 PM > Subject: Re: Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins > > On 07/18/2012 10:40 AM, Karsten 'quaid' Wade wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > On 07/18/2012 06:20 AM, Dan Kenigsberg wrote: > >> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 07:05:16AM -0400, Eyal Edri wrote: > >>> Hi, > >>> > >>> Following last infra meeting, i want to open for discussion the > >>> security issues that may arise if we allow Jenkins to run jobs > >>> (i.e any code) with every gerrit patch. > >>> > >>> The problem: > >>> > >>> In theory, any user that is registered to gerrit might send a > >>> patch to any ovirt project. That code might contain malicious > >>> code, malware, harmfull or just not-related ovirt code that he > >>> wants to use our resources for it. Even though we use limited > >>> sudo on hosts, we can't be sure an exploit will be used against > >>> one of the jenkins slaves. > >>> > >>> > >>> The proposed solutions: > >>> > >>> - black-listing authors (published on ovirt.org?) - white-listing > >>> authors (published on ovirt.org?) - auto approve patch via > >>> comparing to lastest commits - check if author recent patches > >>> were approved in the past? > >>> > >>> adding dan since he raised this issue when we wanted to add vdsm > >>> gerrit tests. > >> In my opinion, we can trust anyone who has already contributed > >> code > >> to the relevant project. We can even say: someone who contributed > >> more than 3 commits over a month ago. > > This seems like a reasonable approach. Trust people first, and it's > > fine to have a method to untrust people if the need arises. That > > shouldn't surprise or disappoint anyone - it's just simple sanity. > > > > The alternatives are to build untrust in to the process from the > > start, which becomes a barrier to getting things done, and > > perpetuates > > a culture of untrust. > > > > I just remind myself, if someone is going to worm their way in to > > our > > trust to run malicious code on our Jenkins instances, there is so > > much > > more damage they can do with that trust. > > > > Trust is like fertilizer, water, and sunshine in the garden - it > > makes > > amazing things grow. :) > I am on the opposite side of this issue. Maybe I have been attacked > by > 1 to many bot's or been a manager when someone I know and trusted > stole > from the company. I need trust to be earned so I +1 on whitelist. > With > that said I think getting on the whitelist should be pretty easy. We > are not talking about blocking there commit's we are talking about > should the automated system run test/code against there patch. I am > still learning Jekins when using a whitelist is there a way to flag > commits for users not in the list? I wonder if there is some way to > create a list that someone can go though and whitelist the user or > reject the user for commits not in the whitelist? > i've never done this in the past. i assume we'll need to read the author email/name from the gerrit patch (before running the code) wget the whitelist page from ovirt.org and match it.. or alternatively run git log and search it there... if there isn't a match, fail the job before running any code.

> Thanks > Robert > > > > - - Karsten > > - -- > > Karsten 'quaid' Wade, Sr. Analyst - Community Growth > > http://TheOpenSourceWay.org .^\ http://community.redhat.com > > @quaid (identi.ca/twitter/IRC) \v' gpg: AD0E0C41 > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Infra mailing list > > Infra(a)ovirt.org > > http://lists.ovirt.org/mailman/listinfo/infra > > _______________________________________________ > Infra mailing list > Infra(a)ovirt.org > http://lists.ovirt.org/mailman/listinfo/infra > _______________________________________________ Infra mailing list Infra(a)ovirt.org http://lists.ovirt.org/mailman/listinfo/infra