From: "Mike Burns" <mburns(a)redhat.com>
To: "Eyal Edri" <eedri(a)redhat.com>
Cc: "Robert Middleswarth" <robert(a)middleswarth.net>, infra(a)ovirt.org
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 8:45:05 PM
Subject: Re: Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins
On Wed, 2012-07-18 at 13:03 -0400, Eyal Edri wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Robert Middleswarth" <robert(a)middleswarth.net>
> > To: infra(a)ovirt.org
> > Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 8:00:44 PM
> > Subject: Re: Security issues when running gerrit patches on
> > jenkins
> >
> > On 07/18/2012 10:40 AM, Karsten 'quaid' Wade wrote:
> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > > Hash: SHA1
> > >
> > > On 07/18/2012 06:20 AM, Dan Kenigsberg wrote:
> > >> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 07:05:16AM -0400, Eyal Edri wrote:
> > >>> Hi,
> > >>>
> > >>> Following last infra meeting, i want to open for discussion
> > >>> the
> > >>> security issues that may arise if we allow Jenkins to run
> > >>> jobs
> > >>> (i.e any code) with every gerrit patch.
> > >>>
> > >>> The problem:
> > >>>
> > >>> In theory, any user that is registered to gerrit might send a
> > >>> patch to any ovirt project. That code might contain malicious
> > >>> code, malware, harmfull or just not-related ovirt code that
> > >>> he
> > >>> wants to use our resources for it. Even though we use limited
> > >>> sudo on hosts, we can't be sure an exploit will be used
> > >>> against
> > >>> one of the jenkins slaves.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> The proposed solutions:
> > >>>
> > >>> - black-listing authors (published on ovirt.org?) -
> > >>> white-listing
> > >>> authors (published on ovirt.org?) - auto approve patch via
> > >>> comparing to lastest commits - check if author recent patches
> > >>> were approved in the past?
> > >>>
> > >>> adding dan since he raised this issue when we wanted to add
> > >>> vdsm
> > >>> gerrit tests.
> > >> In my opinion, we can trust anyone who has already contributed
> > >> code
> > >> to the relevant project. We can even say: someone who
> > >> contributed
> > >> more than 3 commits over a month ago.
> > > This seems like a reasonable approach. Trust people first, and
> > > it's
> > > fine to have a method to untrust people if the need arises.
> > > That
> > > shouldn't surprise or disappoint anyone - it's just simple
> > > sanity.
> > >
> > > The alternatives are to build untrust in to the process from
> > > the
> > > start, which becomes a barrier to getting things done, and
> > > perpetuates
> > > a culture of untrust.
> > >
> > > I just remind myself, if someone is going to worm their way in
> > > to
> > > our
> > > trust to run malicious code on our Jenkins instances, there is
> > > so
> > > much
> > > more damage they can do with that trust.
> > >
> > > Trust is like fertilizer, water, and sunshine in the garden -
> > > it
> > > makes
> > > amazing things grow. :)
> > I am on the opposite side of this issue. Maybe I have been
> > attacked
> > by
> > 1 to many bot's or been a manager when someone I know and trusted
> > stole
> > from the company. I need trust to be earned so I +1 on
> > whitelist.
> > With
> > that said I think getting on the whitelist should be pretty easy.
> > We
> > are not talking about blocking there commit's we are talking
> > about
> > should the automated system run test/code against there patch. I
> > am
> > still learning Jekins when using a whitelist is there a way to
> > flag
> > commits for users not in the list? I wonder if there is some way
> > to
> > create a list that someone can go though and whitelist the user
> > or
> > reject the user for commits not in the whitelist?
> >
>
> i've never done this in the past.
> i assume we'll need to read the author email/name from the gerrit
> patch (before running the code)
> wget the whitelist page from
ovirt.org and match it..
>
> or alternatively run git log and search it there...
>
> if there isn't a match, fail the job before running any code.
No, I don't think we want to have failures in the main build job.
What
about a separate job that verifies the patch submitter, then triggers
the build job. Would probably need to pass the GERRIT_REFSPEC
variable
between the 2 builds somehow.
of course, the main job won't be touched.
i was talking about a new job that will only be used with gerrit patches.
and it can fail and give '-1' if the submitter is not authorized.
i need to check if we can add an 'error msg' to the user with something like
"Sorry, but you're not authorized to send patch to xxxx project, please send a
request to infra/devel list"...
Mike
>
> > Thanks
> > Robert
> > >
> > > - - Karsten
> > > - --
> > > Karsten 'quaid' Wade, Sr. Analyst - Community Growth
> > >
http://TheOpenSourceWay.org .^\
http://community.redhat.com
> > > @quaid (identi.ca/twitter/IRC) \v' gpg: AD0E0C41
> > >
> > >
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> > >
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