12:05 p.m.
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------030204050405060907020301
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Sven,
Thanks for you response, I will read some more.
But as you say it has been known for a while and I was aware of it for
many years although never diving into the specifics. I always thought it
was not a practical attack vector
What caught my attention was that it was so fast it can be done in less
then a minute:
Lightning-Fast Attack: *Even in the worst case scenario (cross-VM)
the attack**
**succeeds in less than a minute. To the best of our knowledge, no
faster attack**
**has been implemented against AES in a realistic cloud-like
setting. This also**
**means that just one minute of co-location with the encryption
server suffices to**
**recover the key.*
For the most parts, it's easier to hack you machine directly
or social-engineer your way into it, than it is to hack/get
access to a different vm on the same system and than hack another vm.
So that was the part that worries me, if I have a public cloud offering
and someone doesn't hack a vm but simply rents one. He can then spawn a
new VM every couple of minutes and it will probably be on a different
host each time..... with different neighbours.
You could hack every vulnerable customer VM in a couple of hours this
way and it would all be undetected.
There are also still no automatic tools for this, which I'm aware
of
(if they are, I'd like to be pointed to them).
As soon as automatic attack tools will cover this scenario I'm pretty
sure we'll see an increase in hacked vms and sniffed private keys.
I'm sure
there are automatic tools being built as we speak but they will
not be generally available.
Kind regards,
Jorick Astrego
Netbulae B.V.
On 06/13/2014 09:38 AM, Sven Kieske wrote:
> Hi,
>
> it's kind of you to let those know
> about these attacks who do not already know them, but
> this should be well understood by every professional by know.
>
> Shared resources are never secure, if you
> can not control the access from third parties
> to shared memory.
>
> this does not just affect KSM (or similar
> techniques from vmware, xen and microsoft)
> but also L3-Caches of modern CPUs.
>
> If you are interested in these topics, here are some papers:
>
> L3-Side-Channel attack to recover private
> GPG-Keys from another VM:
>
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448.pdf
>
> Correlation attack against openssl,
> polarssl and libgcrypt on xen and vmware:
>
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/248.pdf
>
> I don't know if IBMs PowerVM is vulnerable to such
> attacks, as it's LPAR architecture is certified
> EAL 4+ (which might not tell anything about this attack
> vector).
>
> But you always need to have in mind, what attack
> scenario you talk about:
>
> These attacks are about a malicious vm (this could be a
> hacked/hijacked vm) which recovers parts of the shared memory
> from a known other instance to attack.
>
> if you have high security concerns you might want _not_
> to share your physical server with third party controlled
> vms, or with vms which might be the target of getting hacked
> (or which runs software, which is known to be vulnerable).
>
> I still consider this scenario not as that relevant today, as
> there are many more low hanging fruits (sadly).
>
> This means in short:
>
For the most parts, it's easier to hack you machine directly
or social-engineer your way into it, than it is to hack/get
access to a different vm on the same system and than hack another vm.
>
There are also still no automatic tools for this, which I'm aware
of
(if they are, I'd like to be pointed to them).
As soon as automatic attack tools will cover this scenario I'm pretty
sure we'll see an increase in hacked vms and sniffed private keys.
>
>
> HTH
>
--------------030204050405060907020301
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
Hi Sven,<br>
<br>
Thanks for you response, I will read some more.<br>
<br>
But as you say it has been known for a while and I was aware of it
for many years although never diving into the specifics. I always
thought it was not a practical attack vector<br>
<br>
What caught my attention was that it was so fast it can be done in
less then a minute:<br>
<br>
<blockquote>Lightning-Fast Attack: <b>Even in the worst case
scenario (cross-VM) the attack</b><b><br>
</b><b>succeeds in less than a minute. To the best of our
knowledge, no faster attack</b><b><br>
</b><b>has been implemented against AES in a realistic cloud-like
setting. This also</b><b><br>
</b><b>means that just one minute of co-location with the
encryption server suffices to</b><b><br>
</b><b>recover the key.</b><br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre wrap=""><blockquote type="cite"><pre
wrap="">For the most parts, it's easier to hack you machine directly
or social-engineer your way into it, than it is to hack/get
access to a different vm on the same system and than hack another vm.</pre>
</blockquote>
</pre>
So that was the part that worries me, if I have a public cloud
offering and someone doesn't hack a vm but simply rents one. He can
then spawn a new VM every couple of minutes and it will probably be
on a different host each time..... with different neighbours.<br>
<br>
You could hack every vulnerable customer VM in a couple of hours
this way and it would all be undetected. <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">There are also still no automatic tools for this, which
I'm aware of
(if they are, I'd like to be pointed to them).
As soon as automatic attack tools will cover this scenario I'm pretty
sure we'll see an increase in hacked vms and sniffed private keys.</pre>
</blockquote>
I'm sure there are automatic tools being built as we speak but they
will not be generally available.<br>
<br>
<br>
Kind regards,<br>
<br>
Jorick Astrego<br>
Netbulae B.V.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 06/13/2014 09:38 AM, Sven Kieske
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:539AAAC8.3080601@mittwald.de"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Hi,
it's kind of you to let those know
about these attacks who do not already know them, but
this should be well understood by every professional by know.
Shared resources are never secure, if you
can not control the access from third parties
to shared memory.
this does not just affect KSM (or similar
techniques from vmware, xen and microsoft)
but also L3-Caches of modern CPUs.
If you are interested in these topics, here are some papers:
L3-Side-Channel attack to recover private
GPG-Keys from another VM:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448.pdf">http://eprint.iac...
Correlation attack against openssl,
polarssl and libgcrypt on xen and vmware:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/248.pdf">https://eprint.i...
I don't know if IBMs PowerVM is vulnerable to such
attacks, as it's LPAR architecture is certified
EAL 4+ (which might not tell anything about this attack
vector).
But you always need to have in mind, what attack
scenario you talk about:
These attacks are about a malicious vm (this could be a
hacked/hijacked vm) which recovers parts of the shared memory
from a known other instance to attack.
if you have high security concerns you might want _not_
to share your physical server with third party controlled
vms, or with vms which might be the target of getting hacked
(or which runs software, which is known to be vulnerable).
I still consider this scenario not as that relevant today, as
there are many more low hanging fruits (sadly).
This means in short:
For the most parts, it's easier to hack you machine directly
or social-engineer your way into it, than it is to hack/get
access to a different vm on the same system and than hack another vm.
There are also still no automatic tools for this, which I'm aware of
(if they are, I'd like to be pointed to them).
As soon as automatic attack tools will cover this scenario I'm pretty
sure we'll see an increase in hacked vms and sniffed private keys.
HTH
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>
--------------030204050405060907020301--