Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins

[Eyal Edri]

----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Middleswarth" <robert at middleswarth.net>
> To: infra at ovirt.org
> Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 8:00:44 PM
> Subject: Re: Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins
> 
> On 07/18/2012 10:40 AM, Karsten 'quaid' Wade wrote:
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> > On 07/18/2012 06:20 AM, Dan Kenigsberg wrote:
> >> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 07:05:16AM -0400, Eyal Edri wrote:
> >>> Hi,
> >>>
> >>> Following last infra meeting, i want to open for discussion the
> >>> security issues that may arise if we allow Jenkins to run jobs
> >>> (i.e any code) with every gerrit patch.
> >>>
> >>> The problem:
> >>>
> >>> In theory, any user that is registered to gerrit might send a
> >>> patch to any ovirt project. That code might contain malicious
> >>> code, malware, harmfull or just not-related ovirt code that he
> >>> wants to use our resources for it. Even though we use limited
> >>> sudo on hosts, we can't be sure an exploit will be used against
> >>> one of the jenkins slaves.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The proposed solutions:
> >>>
> >>> - black-listing authors (published on ovirt.org?) - white-listing
> >>> authors (published on ovirt.org?) - auto approve patch via
> >>> comparing to lastest commits - check if author recent patches
> >>> were approved in the past?
> >>>
> >>> adding dan since he raised this issue when we wanted to add vdsm
> >>> gerrit tests.
> >> In my opinion, we can trust anyone who has already contributed
> >> code
> >> to the relevant project. We can even say: someone who contributed
> >> more than 3 commits over a month ago.
> > This seems like a reasonable approach. Trust people first, and it's
> > fine to have a method to untrust people if the need arises. That
> > shouldn't surprise or disappoint anyone - it's just simple sanity.
> >
> > The alternatives are to build untrust in to the process from the
> > start, which becomes a barrier to getting things done, and
> > perpetuates
> > a culture of untrust.
> >
> > I just remind myself, if someone is going to worm their way in to
> > our
> > trust to run malicious code on our Jenkins instances, there is so
> > much
> > more damage they can do with that trust.
> >
> > Trust is like fertilizer, water, and sunshine in the garden - it
> > makes
> > amazing things grow. :)
> I am on the opposite side of this issue.  Maybe I have been attacked
> by
> 1 to many bot's or been a manager when someone I know and trusted
> stole
> from the company.  I need trust to be earned so I +1 on whitelist.
>  With
> that said I think getting on the whitelist should be pretty easy.  We
> are not talking about blocking there commit's we are talking about
> should the automated system run test/code against there patch.  I am
> still learning Jekins when using a whitelist is there a way to flag
> commits for users not in the list?  I wonder if there is some way to
> create a list that someone can go though and whitelist the user or
> reject the user for commits not in the whitelist?
> 

i've never done this in the past.
i assume we'll need to read the author email/name from the gerrit patch (before running the code)
wget the whitelist page from ovirt.org and match it.. 

or alternatively run git log and search it there... 

if there isn't a match, fail the job before running any code.

> Thanks
> Robert
> >
> > - - Karsten
> > - --
> > Karsten 'quaid' Wade, Sr. Analyst - Community Growth
> > http://TheOpenSourceWay.org  .^\  http://community.redhat.com
> > @quaid (identi.ca/twitter/IRC)  \v'  gpg: AD0E0C41
> >
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
> > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
> >
> > iD8DBQFQBsrp2ZIOBq0ODEERAlfyAKDiJCl6RLXVQluAw9hsX9Uc4ftzMgCgjH6G
> > 0Ejk6rXviSMbc+oiKVTjMUs=
> > =3Hf2
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > _______________________________________________
> > Infra mailing list
> > Infra at ovirt.org
> > http://lists.ovirt.org/mailman/listinfo/infra
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Infra mailing list
> Infra at ovirt.org
> http://lists.ovirt.org/mailman/listinfo/infra
>