Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins

[Mike Burns]

On Wed, 2012-07-18 at 13:03 -0400, Eyal Edri wrote:
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Robert Middleswarth" <robert at middleswarth.net>
> > To: infra at ovirt.org
> > Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 8:00:44 PM
> > Subject: Re: Security issues when running gerrit patches on jenkins
> > 
> > On 07/18/2012 10:40 AM, Karsten 'quaid' Wade wrote:
> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > > Hash: SHA1
> > >
> > > On 07/18/2012 06:20 AM, Dan Kenigsberg wrote:
> > >> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 07:05:16AM -0400, Eyal Edri wrote:
> > >>> Hi,
> > >>>
> > >>> Following last infra meeting, i want to open for discussion the
> > >>> security issues that may arise if we allow Jenkins to run jobs
> > >>> (i.e any code) with every gerrit patch.
> > >>>
> > >>> The problem:
> > >>>
> > >>> In theory, any user that is registered to gerrit might send a
> > >>> patch to any ovirt project. That code might contain malicious
> > >>> code, malware, harmfull or just not-related ovirt code that he
> > >>> wants to use our resources for it. Even though we use limited
> > >>> sudo on hosts, we can't be sure an exploit will be used against
> > >>> one of the jenkins slaves.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> The proposed solutions:
> > >>>
> > >>> - black-listing authors (published on ovirt.org?) - white-listing
> > >>> authors (published on ovirt.org?) - auto approve patch via
> > >>> comparing to lastest commits - check if author recent patches
> > >>> were approved in the past?
> > >>>
> > >>> adding dan since he raised this issue when we wanted to add vdsm
> > >>> gerrit tests.
> > >> In my opinion, we can trust anyone who has already contributed
> > >> code
> > >> to the relevant project. We can even say: someone who contributed
> > >> more than 3 commits over a month ago.
> > > This seems like a reasonable approach. Trust people first, and it's
> > > fine to have a method to untrust people if the need arises. That
> > > shouldn't surprise or disappoint anyone - it's just simple sanity.
> > >
> > > The alternatives are to build untrust in to the process from the
> > > start, which becomes a barrier to getting things done, and
> > > perpetuates
> > > a culture of untrust.
> > >
> > > I just remind myself, if someone is going to worm their way in to
> > > our
> > > trust to run malicious code on our Jenkins instances, there is so
> > > much
> > > more damage they can do with that trust.
> > >
> > > Trust is like fertilizer, water, and sunshine in the garden - it
> > > makes
> > > amazing things grow. :)
> > I am on the opposite side of this issue.  Maybe I have been attacked
> > by
> > 1 to many bot's or been a manager when someone I know and trusted
> > stole
> > from the company.  I need trust to be earned so I +1 on whitelist.
> >  With
> > that said I think getting on the whitelist should be pretty easy.  We
> > are not talking about blocking there commit's we are talking about
> > should the automated system run test/code against there patch.  I am
> > still learning Jekins when using a whitelist is there a way to flag
> > commits for users not in the list?  I wonder if there is some way to
> > create a list that someone can go though and whitelist the user or
> > reject the user for commits not in the whitelist?
> > 
> 
> i've never done this in the past.
> i assume we'll need to read the author email/name from the gerrit patch (before running the code)
> wget the whitelist page from ovirt.org and match it.. 
> 
> or alternatively run git log and search it there... 
> 
> if there isn't a match, fail the job before running any code.

No, I don't think we want to have failures in the main build job.  What
about a separate job that verifies the patch submitter, then triggers
the build job.  Would probably need to pass the GERRIT_REFSPEC variable
between the 2 builds somehow.

Mike

> 
> > Thanks
> > Robert
> > >
> > > - - Karsten
> > > - --
> > > Karsten 'quaid' Wade, Sr. Analyst - Community Growth
> > > http://TheOpenSourceWay.org  .^\  http://community.redhat.com
> > > @quaid (identi.ca/twitter/IRC)  \v'  gpg: AD0E0C41
> > >
> > >
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