1:41 a.m.
Talk with Mark about the separation of frontend/backend.
Thanks for him to contribute the following idea:
We think even for backend, not all codes need to run as root, such as
iso search, directory creation and so on.
Gurentee safe may be minimize of use of root.
For previledge cmd: run as super user and limit cmds needed to a single
module.
For libvirt connection: Enable libvirt connection authentication, we can
add sasl user in libvirt for kimchi.
On 2014年03月05日 22:49, Daniel H Barboza wrote:
Information about the issue:
https://github.com/kimchi-project/kimchi/issues/329
We had some ideas about it in the last weekly scrum:
- creating an user 'kimchi' with a lot of privileges. It is the
simplest of the solutions but
implies in a lot of annoyances (different system paths between
distros, libvirt does not
work the same way in all distros). There is no tell about the amount
of new bugs and
issues that shall emerge from such change.
- Separating the UI and the backend. This is my personal favourite but
I believe it is also
the hardest. We can implement this by separating frontend and backend
as 2 separate cherrypy processes, the backend runs as root and the
frontend runs as a
regular user. The communication would be done using the REST API. The
other approach
would be the backend running as a regular python daemon, with root
privileges, and
kimchi would communicate with it using RPC. I believe the latter is
more elegant and the
former is easier to implement.
Things to consider:
- Distro support: Ubuntu, for example, behaves very different from
Fedora as far as
libvirt is concerned. The packaging model (apt-get instead of yum)
differs in support
as well. I think it's a fair guess that RHEL 6 and Suse will have
different behavior as well.
- VM visibility: in the first idea (different user) only the VMs
created by this specific user
would be visible to kimchi, unless we do something about it (tweaking
libvirt configuration
perhaps?).
- User authentication. Right now the user authentication presented in
kimchi exists simply
to authenticate it as a regular user of the host. The owner of the
process will be root, doesn't
matter which user logs in (and I guess this is the critical security
flaw we have). Do we need
ro rethink the authentication model as well?
Please provide your input and ideas!
Daniel
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